Trying to figure out WTF is going on
I am firmly persuaded that we must do everything possible to make the outcome of our independence referendum as conclusive as possible. I am further persuaded that calling the 2026 Holyrood election a de facto independence referendum will not produce a sufficiently decisive outcome. You're currently a free subscriber to Peter A Bell. For the full experience, upgrade your subscription.
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Wednesday, 30 July 2025
A Proud Malcontent Wednesday 30 July 2025
Why the 2026 election cannot be an independence referendum
Trying to figure out WTF is going on Previously, I published an article which compared John Swinney's 'strategy' for independence with the processes followed by various other countries. The conclusion drawn from this comparison was that whereas all these other countries took some kind of action which prompted a course of events which led to independence, John Swinney's 'strategy' by contrast proposes no action whatever. All his 'strategy' amounts to is 'vote for us and have faith'. I don't do faith! That article, based on a comment in The National from James Murphy mentioned Norway as one of the examples of a real-world independence movement. I happens that Norway is the what I consider the instance that is most meaningfully comparable to Scotland. There are enough similarities for such a comparison to make sense. Although making too direct a comparison is likely to be misleading. Here is a capsule timeline of Norway's independence process produced by Gemini Advanced AI. Norway's path to independence from Sweden in 1905 was a culmination of a long period of increasing Norwegian nationalism and a desire for greater self-determination within the union. Here's a timeline of key events: Formation of the Union (1814):
Growing Norwegian Nationalism and Grievances (mid-19th Century to early 20th Century):
The Road to Dissolution (1905):
Norway's independence in 1905 is often cited as a successful example of a peaceful, negotiated dissolution of a union, particularly given the initial tensions that nearly led to war. I think you will see what I mean about similarities. But note also the differences. You will see also how the example of Norway illustrates the conclusion of the article which is that Independence doesn’t come from waiting. It comes from acting. Note how the Declaration of Dissolution precedes both the confirmatory plebiscite and the negotiations with Sweden.There are lessons here that the nominally pro-independence parties desperately need to learn. One of the points where the comparison between Scotland and Norway breaks down is the outcome of the latter's referendum on the dissolution of the union with Sweden. The people of Norway voted overwhelmingly in favour of dissolution, with 'Yes' taking 99.95% of the votes. No ambiguity there! A 'Yes' vote of this magnitude is vanishingly unlikely to happen in Scotland. We might match their turnout of 85.42%. In the sham independence referendum of 2014 we managed a turnout of 84.59%. But it is safe to assume that in a proper constitutional referendum, the most that we can expect for 'Yes' is around 70% well short of Norway's 99.95%. This is because there is a hardcore of Unionists and British Nationalists who will never vote to end the Union. This hardcore accounts for around 20% of the electorate. Allow for switherers who switch from 'Yes' to 'No' in the voting booth and you're left with maybe 75%. 75% of an 85% turnout is around 64% of the whole electorate. which is pretty decisive. But if the vote drops to 65% while the turnout remain 85%, that is only 55% of the electorate. Much less conclusive. If the vote is 70% but turnout falls to 75%, that is 52% of the electorate. A vote of 65% on a turnout of 75% is less than 49% of the electorate - breaking that psychologically important 50% barrier. Please note that I am not suggesting any kind of qualified majority requirement for a proper constitutional referendum in Scotland. I am merely making the point that a result as convincing as that in Norway is almost certainly not achievable here in Scotland. And that psychological barrier at 50% is very real. I am firmly persuaded that we must do everything possible to make the outcome of our independence referendum as conclusive as possible. I am further persuaded that calling the 2026 Holyrood election a de facto independence referendum will not produce a sufficiently decisive outcome. As noted earlier, there is a hardcore of voters who are never going to vote 'Yes'. We will never persuade them to vote for independence. But we have to ensure that they can accept the outcome when it is not what they voted for. Of course, in a democracy the 'losers' are under an obligation to accept the will of the majority. They may campaign peacefully to overturn that choice. But a clear democratic vote must be respected. No doubt there is a hardcore of the hardcore who wouldn't accept even a 99.95% 'Yes' vote. But we must work to make it as difficult as possible for them to cast doubt on the result. We can be sure that every opportunity to dispute the outcome will be seized upon by the British state and Unionists/British Nationalists in Scotland. Doubt is corrosive and must be reduced to the absolute minimum. Pretending an election is a referendum would leave far too many cracks to be exploited by those intent on preserving the Union. An election is never binary. Referendums always are. Multi-option referendums are possible but very rarely happen because they require multiple elimination rounds of voting to get to a final binary choice. A proper constitutional referendum must be binary. An election cannot be binary. Elections are always about a whole range of issues. The referendum question would be just another election issue. Opponents could easily claim that people may have been voting for something other than the referendum issue. They could cast doubt on the outcome. Perhaps even mount a legal challenge. (It is worth noting here that the #ScottishUDI plan gets around this by introducing a binary element with the Manifesto for Independence. And it does not propose using the election as a de facto referendum on independence per se, but on the power of the Scottish Parliament to legislate for a constitutional referendum. Which is rather less contentious an issue.) Both the SNP and Alba Party appear to recognise that a de facto referendum on independence cannot be conclusive as neither is proposing that it be determinative. When electioneering both parties talk about the 2026 election as if it might decide the matter. They talk of the people's choice. In reality, however, the people would not be choosing independence - for two reasons. Firstly, because independence is not what is being offered. What is being offered is negotiations with Westminster in the forlorn hope of getting independence. Secondly, because what they think they're voting for cannot be delivered. The Scottish Parliament lacks the power to deliver independence. Therefore, even if the vote was really a vote for independence rather than merely a vote for 'negotiations', it would be a vote for nothing. If the nominally pro-independence parties thought a 'Yes' vote on a binary issue in a decidedly non-binary election could be determinate, there would be no need to "negotiate for independence" or seek a Section 30 order so as to have a sham independence referendum to back up the pretend referendum. The Scottish people are sovereign. Which means that when we choose independence that choice has to be determinative. It has to be the final word on the matter. Therefore, the choice must not be vague or ambiguous or tentative. A de facto referendum is all of these. What is meant by 'independence' anyway? We are told that we can vote for independence in a de facto referendum. But the term is never defined. We are not told what ensues from this vote. There is no answer to the 'what next?' question. Other than 'negotiations' which the British may or may not turn up for. As James Murphy's examples show, the precedent is that independence is established before negotiations begin. It is not independence that would be negotiated. It is non-negotiable after the people have decided. When the SNP and Alba talk of 'negotiations' with Westminster, they cannot be referring to talks on a post-independence settlement because independence hasn't yet been declared. This is how confused the nominally pro-independence parties are. In truth, they haven't a clue about the process by which Scotland's independence will be restored. They aren't even thinking about that process. They are thinking only of electoral success and the rewards this entails. Others are thinking about the process. That is why we have the #ScottishUDI plan. Parts of the SNP membership have also been thinking about the 'how' of independence. That is why we have the #NewingtonResolution that has been submitted for debate at the party's October conference.
If there are similar moves afoot in Alba Party, I have no knowledge of them. The #NewingtonResolution is informed by the same perspective on the constitutional issue as the #ScottishUDI plan. It is a perspective that is unconcerned about electoral success. The imperative is not to devise a strategy for winning elections but to develop a process which allows us to choose independence in a manner that is conclusive and beyond challenge. A de facto referendum simply won't do. Invite your friends and earn rewardsIf you enjoy Peter A Bell, share it with your friends and earn rewards when they subscribe.
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